19081948 .Letter and memorandum dated 19 August 1948 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the Chairman of the Commission (S/AC.12/44)
19081948 .Letter and memorandum dated 19 August 1948 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the Chairman of the Commission (S/AC.12/44)
19 August 1948
I have the honour to refer to your letter of 13 August, forwarding the resolution adopted by the United Nations. Commission at its 39th meeting and stating that this resolution is intended to present the principles which may serve as a basis of discussion. At our informal meeting on 14 August, you reiterated that the proposals contained in the resolution were only meant to serve as a basis of discussion, and you kindly offered to clarify and elucidate any points arising out of these proposals.
The Government of Pakistan has given their most serious consideration to the proposals made by the Commission, but regret that they are not in a position to indicate their views with regard to them without obtaining clarification of a number of important points. The matters with regard to which further elucidation is required are set out in the attached memorandum. It would be greatly appreciated if the Commission could provide the elucidation requested.
While reserving their views with regard to the proposals formulated by the Commission, the Government of Pakistan would like to submit certain observations with regard to the Commission's approach to the question of a cease-fire. As the Commission is aware, the Pakistan representatives, in their discussions with the Commission during its stay in Karachi from 31 July to 13 August, put forward the view that the proposals regarding a cease-fire should be completely divorced from all other proposals. In the view of the Pakistan Government, the truce proposals contained in part II of the Com mission's resolution are so closely interlinked with the final solution of the Kashmir question that it is impossible to separate the one from the other. This was fully recognized by the members of the Security Council who sponsored the resolution of 21 April. Senator Austin explained that the resolution had a certain unity and all its parts were inter-related. For example, the proposal with regard to the withdrawal of tribesmen could only be implemented if there was satisfaction in respect of the reconstitution of the State Government and the creation of other conditions in which the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan could be determined by means of a free and impartial plebiscite.
It is the considered opinion of the Pakistan Government that there are only two practical ways of dealing with the Jammu and Kashmir situation, namely:
(1) To bring about a cease-fire pure and simple such as is in part I of the Commission's resolution; or
(2) To attempt at the very start a complete and final solution of the entire Jammu and Kashmir question.
The Pakistan Government regret to note that the Commission has not adopted the first alternative, which would have put a stop to the fighting immediately, and, in the calmer atmosphere thereby created, would have greatly improved the chances of a final settlement being reached. The result of extending the scope of the resolution beyond part I must inevitably be to bring the whole field of the dispute under immediate discussion and thereby to delay the attainment of a cease-fire until a final solution of the whole problem can be agreed upon.
(Signed) Zafrullah Khan Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations,
Government of Pakistan
APPENDIX
Memorandum Regarding points in the Commission’s Resolution of 13 August 1948 Requesting Further Elucidations
Preliminary
It has been explained to the Commission that only the Azad Kashmir Government can authorize the issue of cease-fire orders to their own forces. Pakistan Government informed what steps Kashmir Government proposes.
Preamble the Commission's resolution
The preamble the resolution of the Commission that certain implementation of the Commission's endeavours "to assist Governments India and Pakistan affecting final settlement situation". Government of Pakistan unable appreciate exact significance this statement. The preamble the Security Council's resolution of 21 1948 (S/726) clearly affirms the desire both India Pakistan "that the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir India Pakistan should decided through the democratic method free and impartial plebiscite", instructs the Commission to "place good offices and mediation at the disposal the Governments of India Pakistan a to facilitating taking of necessary measures, both with respect the restoration peace and the holding plebiscite the two Governments, acting co-operation one another and with the Commission", and recommends certain measures the two Governments being in opinion "appropriate bring about cessation the and create proper conditions for free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan It is thus clear that the dispute between the two Dominions relating to Jammu and Kashmir is "whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan" and that the settlement of this dispute is to be brought about by means of a free and impartial plebiscite. It is presumed, therefore, that the expression a final settlement of the situation employed by the Commission in the preamble to its resolution means in the words of the Security Council the creation of "proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan." If the expression "a final settlement of the situation" has any implication, direct or indirect, whether falling short of or going beyond the quotation set out from the Security Council's resolution, the Government of Pakistan wishes to be apprised of it.
Part I of the Commission's resolution
The Pakistan Government is unable to appreciate the exact significance of the opening words of paragraph D of part I of the resolution. If and when a cease-fire has been arranged, the Commission will be under the inescapable necessity of appointing military observers for the purpose set out in the paragraph. The number, duties, functions and posting of these observers will, no doubt, be at the discretion of the Commission. The Pakistan Government wishes to be certain that the Commission is not in any doubt that if a cease-fire order is agreed to, its observance will inevitably require supervision by neutral military observers appointed by and acting under the authority of the Commission.
Part II of the Commission's resolution
The discussions before the Security Council on the subject of Jammu and Kashmir proceeded on the basis that India did not desire a military solution of the problem, but would be content to abide by the results of a free and impartial plebiscite. It was recognized by the Security Council that the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir had flared up as the result of military and other repressive measures adopted by the ruler against his subjects, and that the only method of securing a cessation of the fighting was to create conditions which would satisfy everybody concerned that the question of accession of the State to India or Pakistan would be settled on the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite. While the Security Council was still engaged in the consideration of the Kashmir case, India was steadily building up its armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir. This building-up process did not cease on 21 April 1948, but was continued and intensified. The Indian Army mounted a big offensive in the beginning of April, thereby causing a material change in the situation. This offensive action has continued ever since. The publicly declared intention of the Government of India was to secure a military decision in Jammu and Kashmir, thus presenting the United Nations Commission with a fait accompli. This situation not only put in jeopardy the entire population of the areas under the Azad Kashmir Government, and led to a big influx of refugees into Pakistan, but also constituted a direct threat to Pakistan's security. It was this which compelled the Government of Pakistan to move their troops into certain defensive positions.
Paragraph A, 1 of part II of the Commission's resolution states that the presence of Pakistan troops in the territory of the State constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council. This is obviously a one-sided and inadequate description, since, as pointed out above, the buildup of India's forces, and their launching an all-out offensive had already materially changed the situation. Even as a factual statement, apart altogether from the feasibility or otherwise of the proposal based upon it, the paragraph should have included the facts mentioned above which necessitated the presence of Pakistan troops in Jammu and Kashmir. The Government of Pakistan is unable to appreciate the Care Commission.
Without at all implying that the proposals set out in the resolution of the Commission could from the basis of discussion, the Pakistan Government fell that the possibility of the a truce being broken by the Government of India cannot be ruled out. It would materially assist the Pakistan Government in their appreciation of the various proposals contained in the resolution if the Commission would be so good as to take the Pakistan Government into its confidence as to the measures or guarantees which the Commission may have in mind to safeguard the security of Pakistan and the population of the areas under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government against any subsequent aggressive action by the Government of India and of the Sikh and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh volunteer bands. In particular, the Pakistan Government would be glad to know whether the Commission intends to secure the services of an international or neutral force for this purpose and, if so, what the strength of such a force would be.
Paragraph A, 2 seeks the agreement of the Pakistan Government to the using of their best endeavours to secure the withdrawal from the State of tribesmen, etc., who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting. The Commission is no doubt aware that the Security Council was convinced that it would not be possible to persuade the tribesmen and other sympathizers of the Azad Kashmir Government to withdraw unless they were satisfied as to the security of the Muslim population of the State and the establishment of conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite. The Government of Pakistan is unable to discover any proposals in the resolution of the Commission designed to secure and guarantee these conditions. Would the Commission kindly indicate what measures it proposed to adopt to convince the tribesmen and other elements concerned that these conditions have been or will be established, and that no danger or prejudice would result to the Muslim population of the State even if the terms of the truce were subsequently broken by the Government of India?
It has been explained to the Commission that a large number of Sikh and Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh volunteer bands have entered the State since 15 August 1947, and have been operating in the areas occupied by the Indian armed forces, committing all kinds of atrocities upon and terrorizing the Muslim population. There is no proposal in the resolution of the Commission to the effect that such elements must withdraw from the State. The Pakistan Government wishes to be informed what proposal the Commission has in mind in this connexion.
In paragraph A, 3 the Commission proposes that, pending a final solution, the territory at present under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government will be administered by that Government under the surveillance of the Commission. The Commission no doubt realizes that the population of this territory is almost wholly Muslim and is in full support of the Azad Kashmir Government. On the other hand, the majority of the population of the territory under the control of the Government of India is opposed to the regime established by the Government of India. The Government of Pakistan would wish to be enlightened as to the reasons which, while necessitating or rendering desirable the surveillance of the Commission over the Azad Kashmir Government in respect of the territories of the latter, would not with much greater force call for the surveillance of the Commission over the regime operating in the rest of the State. Since the Commission considers that it is in a position to take certain territories under its surveillance, there would appear to be no objection, in principle. to the Commission taking the whole of Jammu and Kashmir under its surveillance.
The Commission has asked for the withdrawal of Pakistan troops from Jammu and Kashmir, though these troops are in wholly Muslim areas and have been welcomed by the local population. On the other hand, the Commission is aware of the serious objections to the quartering of non Muslim troops on a predominately Muslim population. The Government of Pakistan therefore wishes to be informed of the reasons which necessitate the retention of any portion of India's armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir.
Assuming that a truce could be agreed upon on the basis of the Commission's proposals the Government of Pakistan would appreciate an indication from the Commission of the manner in which the Commission proposes, in accordance with the concluding portion of paragraph B, 1, to secure a synchronized and simultaneous withdrawal of the Pakistani forces and the bulk of the Indian forces from the State.
The Pakistan Government wishes to know whether the surveillance of the Commission over the territories of Azad Kashmir implies any control over the Azad Kashmir forces, which would under the Commission's proposals remain intact. If so, what control does the Commission contemplate exercising over the State forces, the local militia raised by Sheikh Abdullah and over any Indian armed forces that may be left in the State under the Commission's proposals ?
The Security Council's resolution of 21 April 1948 contemplates the maintenance of law and order throughout the State with the aid of local forces. Does the Commission contemplate that any additional forces would be required for the maintenance of law and order in any part of the State? If so, the Pakistan Government would welcome an indication of the Commission's view whether it intends to call upon both India and Pakistan to provide such forces as contemplated in paragraph 5 of the Security Council's resolution of 21 April 1948.
The Security Council's resolution of 21 April 1948 sets out in paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 a number of conditions for the restoration of human and political rights, including the return of those who had left or been compelled to leave the State since 15 August 1947. The Pakistan Government wishes to be informed whether paragraph B, 3 of the Commission's resolution is intended to cover and guarantee all these conditions from the moment a truce is agreed upon.
Part III of the Commission's resolution
The observations submitted in paragraph 2 above apply. with equal force to part III of the Commission's resolution. The Government of Pakistan would welcome an elucidation of this part. It states that "the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people" and that the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan shall "enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured". It may be pointed out that some of these conditions are set out in the Security Council's resolution of 21 April 1948. It is presumed that consultations between the two Governments and the Commission would be designed to secure the implementation of these conditions and the devising of any further conditions that may become necessary or may appear to be desirable.
The most important of the conditions agreed upon by the Security Council were that:
(a) The Government of Jammu and Kashmir would be reconstituted so as to ensure that the major political groups in the State would share "equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the Ministerial level" (paragraph 6), and the interim administration so formed would, in the words of Senator Austin, be such as "would command the confidence a and respect of all the people of the State and would be a symbol to the people on both sides that the Government of the State was officially neutral on this issue" of accession to India or Pakistan.
(b) A Plebiscite Administrator would be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and would be vested with wide powers, including power of direction and supervision of State forces and police (paragraphs 7, 8 and 9).
(c) The appointment of special magistrates to deal with certain types of cases (paragraph 10).
The Pakistan Government presumes that the object of the concluding portion of part III of the Commission's resolution is to secure agreement on the implementation of these among other conditions of a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan.