17021953 --291 Text of the Letter transmitted to the United Nations Representative in Geneva, on 17 February 1953, by the representative of Pakistan
17021953 --291 Text of the Letter transmitted to the United Nations Representative in Geneva, on 17 February 1953, by the representative of Pakistan
On 14th February, 1953, you sent me a revised version of your twelve proposals together with a covering letter asking for my comments thereon. I took the opportunity of discussing these proposals with you on 16th February, 1953. In the course of this meeting I requested you to furnish me with your reasons for proposing 21,000 Indian and State armed forces for the Indian side as against 6,000 Azad Kashmir Forces for the other side of the cease-fire line. Your only observation was that the proposal had been framed with a view to obtaining the agreement of the Government of India to it.
As desired by you I am enclosing with this letter a short statement of my views concerning the course of the Geneva negotiations, and the substance of the discussion which I had with you on 16th February, 1953.
I told you during our discussion that in view of the considerations summarized in paragraph 9 of the enclosed memorandum I would not be justified in forwarding your revised proposals to the Government of Pakistan for their consideration but that I would do so if you so desired.
(Signed) Zafrulla Khan
Foreign Minister of Pakistan Memorandum containing a resume of the Pakistan delegation's views concerning issues discussed at the Geneva conference from 4 February to 17 February 1953
I. Introductory
The Security Council's resolution of 23 December 1952 [S/2883] urged the Governments of India and Pakistan "to enter into immediate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, this number to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line... ".
The Government of Pakistan accepted the resolution; the Government of India rejected it.
The United Nations Representative was thus compelled to seek a formula for resumption of negotiations acceptable to the Governments of India and Pakistan. Such a formula was ultimately devised, and was accepted by the parties on 23 January 1953. It read:
"The Governments of India and Pakistan agree to continue negotiations on the question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 bearing in mind the assurances, clarifications and elucidations given to the Governments of India and Pakistan by the UNCIP. This basis for the resumption of the negotiations will be without prejudice, should that become necessary, to a further consideration of the twelve proposals."
The leader of the Pakistan delegation made it clear, however, that if the negotiations to formulate a truce agreement on the basis of the two UNCIP resolutions did not prove successful and a reversion to consideration of the twelve proposals became necessary Pakistan would insist that the figures proposed in the Security Council's resolution of 23 December 1952 must form the basis of the numbers to be ultimately fixed.
II. Negotiations at Geneva-First Phase
The first six days of negotiations were devoted to an examination of the 13 August 1948 resolution of UNCIP. The first part of the resolution, having already been implemented an attempt was made to formulate a truce agreement on the basis of the principles set out in part II of the resolution.
Part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution of UNCIP deals mainly with the problem of partial demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir preparatory to the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. The obligations of the parties in this respect are as under:
1. Obligations of Pakistan
(i) The Government of Pakistan will "use its best endeavour" to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of all tribesmen.
(ii) The Government of Pakistan will withdraw from the State such Pakistan nationals as are "not normally resident therein who have entered the State) for the purpose of fighting". (iii) The Government of Pakistan "agrees to withdraw its troops from the State".
II. Obligations of India
(i) When the Commission (now the United Nations Representative) informs the Government of India. that tribesmen and Pakistan nationals have withdrawn and further that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn "the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission '' (now the United Nations Representative).
(ii) Pending the acceptance of conditions for a final settlement of the situation "the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission (now the United Nations Representative) are considered. necessary to assist local authorities in the observance. of law and order".
It will be seen that under the resolution the withdrawal of Pakistan troops is contingent upon the withdrawal of the "bulk" of the Indian Army [clause B (1) ]. The UNCIP had explained that "synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Governments will be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission" (S/1100, Annex 27, appendix, para, 10).
It was reaffirmed by the Pakistan delegation on 5 February 1953 that once a satisfactory truce agreement based on the above principles was arrived at, the Government of Pakistan would proceed to fulfil all the obligations that devolved on it.
The problem thus resolved itself into one of securing India's agreement to withdraw the "bulk" of its forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir as provided for in part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution. The Pakistan delegation is not aware of the efforts made by the United Nations Representative in this regard. On 10 February 1953 it was informed by the United Nations Representative that the figure of troops that India had proposed for withdrawal in terms of clause B (1) of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution of UNCIP was not such as the United Nations Representative could sponsor for acceptance by Pakistan.
This effort to secure the agreement of the Government of India to a truce having failed, the United Nations Representative decided to revert to an examination of his twelve proposals.
II. Negotiations at Geneva- Second Phase
In the meetings that were held by the United Nations Representative to discuss his twelve proposals the Pakistan delegation made it clear that it could not countenance the discussion of any troop figures for the two sides of the cease fire line beyond the range of figures proposed in the Security Council's resolution of 23 December 1952. This insistence on adherence to the formula contained in the Security Council resolution was due to the affirmation of the Security Council, that the range of figures set out in the resolution of 23 December 1952 had been determined after careful consideration of the military needs on both sides of the cease-fire line.
The Pakistan delegation explained that as a general principle it would ask for the retention of a comparable number of Azad Kashmir forces on the Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line if India insisted upon the retention of a substantial force (within the numbers permitted by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 December 1952) on its side of the cease-fire line, but that if India agreed to reduce the forces on its side to a sufficiently low figure Pakistan could agree to greater disparity between the two forces.
The United Nations Representative presented a revised version of his twelve proposals on 14 February 1953. In discussing these proposals with the Pakistan delegation on 16 February 1953, the United Nations Representative explained that by the term "armed forces" in sub-paragraph (in) of paragraph 7A of the proposals was meant the Azad Kashmir Forces, it being understood at the end of the period of demilitarization administrative and operational control over these forces would pass over from G.H Q. (Pakistan) to the local authorities.
The comments of the Pakistan delegation on these proposals as explained by the United Nations Representative are as follows:
(i) Paragraph 7 of the proposals contravenes the Security Council's resolution of 23 December 1952.
(ii) In the debate that preceded the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution of 23 December 1952 the members of the Council were at pains to affirm and explain that the bracket of figures of troops proposed in the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution on Kashmir had been arrived at after taking into account the military needs of both the Indian occupied areas of the State and Azad Kashmir. No reasons have been advanced by the United Nations Representative to justify any change The figure of troops for the Indian side of the cease-fire line has been arbitrarily raised, without any justification, to 21,000. The Pakistan delegation is convinced that if 21,000 Indian and State armed forces are allowed to remain on the Indian side of the cease-fire line as against only 6,000 Azad Kashmir forces, the security of the Azad Kashmir area would be put in serious jeopardy.
(iii) The figures now suggested by the United Nations Representative would destroy the safeguard contained in paragraph 8 of the twelve proposals (and already accepted by both sides) that "demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period" of demilitarization.
(iv) The figures now proposed have avowedly no other object than to meet India's wishes with regard to the number of forces to be retained at the cease-fire line. This fails to take into account its side of the corresponding needs of security on the Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line. This process of continuously yielding ground in face of Indian intransigence amounts in effect to an endorsement and abetment of the Indian attitude. It is a clear indication to India that its sustained attitude of intransigence would ultimately procure the formulation of a truce agreement on its own terms.