14121951--233 Text of the Reply from the representative of India received on 14 December 1951 by the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan.
14121951--233 Text of the Reply from the representative of India received on 14 December 1951 by the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan.
We should like to state at the outset that in this note we are addressing ourselves strictly to the immediate task before us, viz, that of working out the details of a feasible plan of demilitarization. We shall, therefore, refrain at this stage from commenting upon the arguments, interpretations or implications contained in the statement and in the questions presented to us by the United Nations Representative on 7 December 1951.
It might be useful to state briefly the position adopted in the course of the discussions by the representative of India in regard to the question of the quantum of Indian troops remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of demilitarization. The point was raised whether in view of certain new assurances, it would be possible to reduce the figure originally proposed. In reply it was pointed out that the Government of India was responsible for the security of the State, and security could not be made dependent solely on verbal assurances offered but must be related to the actual conditions prevailing in the area. Therefore the quantum of forces remaining on the Indian side cannot be reduced merely because of the number of assurances offered. It should be remembered that even the UNCIP resolutions contained certain assurances which have not been carried out on the part of Pakistan, witness the jihad and war propaganda in that country and the building up of the Azad Kashmir forces. There was also an assurance accompanying the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, to the effect that during the period of cessation of hostilities Pakistan should not in any way consolidate its position to the disadvantage of the State. Yet there was in fact such consolidation as the UNCIP itself has recorded (vide, paragraph 225 of UNCIP's third interim report). The biggest assurance ever offered was that of a plebiscite on the part of India in October 1947, but that did not prevent the invasion of Kashmir by the Pakistan Army in May 1948. What is essential is that a sense of confidence and security should return to the population of the area, which has been shattered by two invasions and the rather unsettled conditions which have prevailed since that time.
As it was recognized in the course of discussion that the question of security was essentially a military matter, it was agreed that discussion should proceed between the Indian military advisers and General Devers, in order that a practicable plan of demilitarization be worked out. While demilitarization would form part of a single continuous process, it was admitted that in actual implementation, the process could not be completed in "one fell swoop", and that some phasing would be inevitable. On 29 November, General Devers made certain tentative suggestions in writing on how demilitarization might be achieved. These suggestions, of which copies were given in writing, are reproduced below:
"1. D-Day to be 30 days after the principal agreements have been signed. 2. D to D plus 30.
(a) The United Nations observer force be increased to approximately 800 officers and 600 men with necessary jeeps, helicopters and communication equipment to assure that there is no violation of the cease fire agreements and to assist in demobilization of forces and give stability and backing to local governments in maintaining order.
(b) Pakistan to close the western border of the Azad Kashmir sector against unauthorized ingress from the west. This to be done by selected regular troops.
(c) All regular Pakistan forces to be withdrawn to Pakistan except three battalions.
(d) The Azad Kashmir armed forces to be reduced to four battalions.
(e) The regular Indian forces to be reduced to one division and headquarters. one line of communications area
(f) A police force of 4,000 civilians to be created in the Azad territory of Kashmir as follows:
(i) 1,200 carefully selected armed civilians who were formerly members of the disbanded Azad forces;
(ii) 1,200 carefully selected armed civilians who at no time have served as members of the disbanded Azad forces. None will be Pakistan nationals or former members of the Pakistan armed forces;
(iii) 800 carefully selected unarmed civilians who were formerly members of the disbanded Azad forces; and (iv) 800 carefully selected unarmed civilians who at no time have served as members of the disbanded Azad forces. None will be Pakistan nationals or former members of the Pakistan forces."
The Indian military advisers, after consulting the Government of India, were able to agree to the basic principles underlying General Devers' programme, with certain reservations which were to be discussed further:
(a) The figure of Indian troops remaining at the end of demilitarization given by the Indian military advisers, was based on the assumption that there would be no Pakistan Army or Azad Kashmir battalions (including the Gilgit Scouts, etc.). General Devers' programme envisages the retention at the end of the period mentioned therein of three Pakistan Army battalions in addition to four Azad Kashmir battalions. Accordingly, for that stage of demilitarization, it was proposed by the Indian military advisers that in addition to the division and the line of communications area headquarters on the Indian side contemplated in the programme, there should be three additional battalions. If this addition is considered not to be fully warranted, the Indian military advisers would be prepared to reconsider this point, in order that their figure may correspond more closely to that contemplated in the programme.
(b) It was pointed out that the period of thirty days suggested for the implementation of the programme was impracticable because of winter conditions and the inaccessible nature of the terrain. This difficulty was fully appreciated by General Devers, who recognized that a longer period would be necessary.
(c) As regards the observer force proposed, it was suggested by the Indian military advisers that a force of observers twice that posted at present on the Indian side of the cease-fire line should suffice, while on the Pakistan side a force of 100 to 150 appeared to be adequate. It was pointed out that even with the presence of large forces on both sides of the cease-fire line, the observer force had not been able to prevent the frequent occurrence of incursions and infiltration into the Indian side of the cease-fire line. It can hardly be expected that the replacement of the Indian protective forces by a force of observers, however large, would improve the situation. On the contrary the presence of large numbers of foreign military personnel, besides creating serious administrative and organizational problems, would give rise to the gravest apprehensions and misgivings in the minds of the local population.
(d) Certain suggestions were offered for the recruitment of the civil force of 4,000 on the Azad Kashmir side.
With agreement reached on the programme proposed by General Devers, agreement on the final stage of demilitarization would clearly be greatly facilitated. To reach the final stage would involve, on the Pakistan side, the withdrawal of three Pakistan battalions and the disbandment and disarming of four Azad Kashmir battalions, which amounts to a total reduction of about 6,000 men. Against this, the Indian military advisers are prepared to make a substantial reduction in the Indian forces, of armour, artillery and infantry, amounting to over 7,000 troops.
The Indian military advisers consider that the force. remaining at the conclusion of the above process is under present conditions the irreducible minimum compatible with the requirements of security. We say "under present conditions", because the Prime Minister, in paragraph 6 of his reply of 11 September 1951 [S/2375, annex 3] to Mr. Graham's letter of 7 September 1951 [S/2375, annex 21, has explained the position fully. For convenience of reference, we reproduce a portion of that paragraph:
"Any further reduction could only take place at some risk. The Government of India will be glad, however, to consider this problem with the United Nations Representative from time to time and to give effect to the measures that may be agreed upon between them to make further withdrawals or reductions. It wishes me to give you the assurance that it is its policy to reduce its forces in the State to the minimum necessary to safeguard its security; the greater the measure of security that the State enjoys from threats of incursion or aggression, the smaller will be this minimum."
It should be noticed that the Indian troops remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarization under this plan are over 7,000 less than the minimum stated in paragraph 8 of the Prime Minister's letter of 11 September 1951. We have accepted almost all the suggestions made by General Devers to our military advisers on 29 November 1951. The suggestions have been helpful and we have accepted them, at some risk to the State and to the sense of security of its people, because we have been anxious to go as far as we could to arrive at an agreement.
The quantum of troops proposed in paragraph 5 above should be compared with the force of about a dozen battalions of infantry plus artillery, cavalry and other protective forces which were maintained by the State of Jammu and Kashmir before the partition of India, when the borders of the State were secured against any external threat by the presence of large garrisons in British India at all the strategic approaches to the State, and when conditions of comparative peace and security prevailed on the sub-continent and in the neighbouring countries. Not only has the State since suffered two invasions, but on some of its frontiers extremely unsettled conditions still prevail. These factors must inevitably influence the strength of the forces now required for its security. It should also be pointed out that any appreciation affecting the security of the territory and the strength of the forces required to ensure it, must remain the responsibility of the Government of India.
We notice with some surprise that in paragraph 4 of the questionnaire, mention has been made of the State militia. We should again like to point out that the State militia has not been mentioned in either of the UNCIP resolutions, nor has it been mentioned in Mr. Graham's letter of 7 September 1951. As was explained to the United Nations Representative in the course of discussions both in New Delhi and recently, the State Militia is a police administered and maintained by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Demilitarization. concerns only the Indian and State armed forces; the State militia, which is a police force, clearly does not fall within. Neither category.
As regards the suggestion for the bringing of United Nations forces into the State, it has been made clear more than once on behalf of the Government of India that the replacement of Indian security forces by foreign troops, however constituted, can under no circumstances be accepted. We do not understand why this suggestion is being repeated.
As regards the question of fixing a date for the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator, it has already been stated, in paragraph 9 of the letter of the Prime Minister of India dated 11 September 1951, that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the State, on both sides of the cease-fire line, permit of a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out the plebiscite. To appoint the Plebiscite Administrator before he can function effectively would be premature.
APPENDIX
Government of India's demilitarization plan for discussion
The plan is in two phases:
Phase I
1. D-Day to be 30 days after the Principal Agreements have been signed.
2. D to D plus x days.
(a) Pakistan to close the western border of the Azad Kashmir sector against unauthorized ingress from the west.
(b) All regular Pakistan forces are withdrawn to Pakistan except three battalions.
(c) The Azad Kashmir armed forces to be reduced to four battalions.
(d) The regular Indian forces to be reduced to one division and one line of communications area headquarters, as defined in paragraph 8 of the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Graham, dated 11 September 1951.
(e) A police force of 4,000 civilians to be created in the Azad territory of Kashmir half of which should be armed and half unarmed. One half should not be Pakistan nationals or former members of the Pakistan or Azad Kashmir armed forces.
Phase II
1. All remaining regular Pakistan forces to withdrawn to Pakistan be
2. All remaining Azad Kashmir armed forces to be disarmed and disbanded.
3. Since (1) and (2) will amount to a total reduction of about 6,000 men, a substantial reduction will be made in the remaining regular Indian forces, of armour, artillery and infantry, amounting to over 7,000 troops.
The following brief explanation is offered of these two phases:
Phase I
This embodies almost all the written suggestions made to the Indian military advisers by General Devers on 29 November 1951, and therefore needs little explanation. The only point that may perhaps be mentioned here is that while General Devers suggested a period of thirty days for this phase, the Indian military advisers consider that, because of winter conditions and the inaccessible nature of the terrain, a longer period will be necessary. General Devers appears to appreciate this difficulty fully.
Phase II
This follows almost mathematically from phase I. Indeed, the reduction contemplated in this phase on the Indian side of the cease-fire line is more than on the other side.
It should be noticed that the Indian troops remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarization under this plan are over 7,000 less than the minimum stated in paragraph 8 of the Prime Minister's letter of 11 September 1951. We have accepted almost all the suggestions made by General Devers to our military advisers on 29 November 1951. The suggestions have been helpful and we have accepted them, at some risk to the State and to the sense of security of its people, because we have been anxious to go as far as we could to arrive at an agreement.
As regards the possibility of further withdrawals or reductions of the Indian troops, we reproduce an extract from paragraph 6 of the Prime Minister's reply of 11 September 1951 to Mr. Graham's letter of 7 September 1951.
"Any further reduction could only take place at some risk. The Government of India will be glad, however, to consider this problem with the United Nations Representative from time to time and to give effect to the measures that may be agreed upon between them to make further withdrawals or reductions. It wishes me to give you the assurance that it is its policy to reduce its forces in the State to the minimum necessary to safeguard its security; the greater the measure of security that the State enjoys from threats of incursion or aggression, the smaller will be this minimum."