24021950 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sunde (Norway) in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sunde (Norway) in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950

It with considerable uneasiness that have followed the developments in the Kashmir case since the Security Council resumed consideration of it in December last. The valiant efforts of General McNaughton have failed to bridge the gap between the positions of India and Pakistan, and the poison from this festering wound in the relations between the two great nations is almost daily breaking out in new and exacerbated disagreements.

At the Council's [458th meeting] on 29 December 1949, I addressed myself particularly to General McNaughton's proposal. His suggested basis of agreement seemed to me, said eminently fair and just, and added that I failed to perceive what objections the parties could muster against the proposal that would be reconcilable with their avowed common goal of free and impartial plebiscite. purposely couched my statement in cautious terms because I realised that it would be unwise to attempt a final and categorical evaluation as long as the parties themselves had not expressed their opinions.

Since that meeting we have heard long and carefully argued submissions from both parties. These submissions have covered practically all aspects of the Kashmir conflict. Their important burden, however, has been the agreements for and against the McNaughton proposal. Today we have an adequate basis for judging that proposal and the parties' reactions to it. feel, therefore, that as members of the Security Council we have a duty, at this stage, to express our opinions clearly and forthrightly. Only in this way will it be possible for the Council to help the parties towards the elaboration of a just and workable solution.

have listened to the statements of the parties with keen attention and have studied the verbatim records [463rd, 464th, 465th and 466th meetings] with scrupulous care. I have also endeavoured conscientiously to keep an open mind to all the arguments in order not to allow myself to be prematurely persuaded by any particular line of reasoning, however convenient it might seem. But now the time has come for a final appraisal, and there is no longer any doubt in my mind as to whose reasoning has the best foundation of fairness and justice. It is General McNaughton's.

I do not mean to say that General Mc Naughton's proposal ought to be accepted by the parties without the slightest change. Both parties have proposed amendments to it, and it is possible that some of its provisions might be improved upon. But as for the essential features and the approach to the problem, I am firmly convinced that General Mc Naughton is right..

His proposal proceeds from the obviously correct point of departure: India's and Pakistan's agreement that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people. This agreement, first briefly stated in part III of the 13 August 1948 resolution [S/1100 paragraph 75] and subsequently elaborated in greater detail in the 5 January 1949 resolution [S/1196 paragraph 15], is not merely an important part of the edifice which has been laboriously built up by the Commission in the two resolutions; it is the keystone which carries the whole structure and to which all the other parts are intimately related

This does not mean that the other parts of the structure of agreement should be discarded or disregarded on the contrary. On this point also I agree with General Mc Naughton. The substantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles which has already been reached between the two Governments under the auspices of the United Nations must be preserved.

We must bear in mind that it was under the terms of this agreement, incorporated in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which I have just mentioned, that cease-fire orders were issued by the opposing parties on 27 January 1949 [S/1196 paragraph 14). The cease-fire agreement of 1 July 1949 [S/1430, Add. 1, annex 26], completely democrats on the ground, is also based upon and integrated into the same structure. Any attempt to bypass or whittle away its basic principles would jeopardise the cease-fire which has so painstakingly been established by the Commission.

We know from the Commission's own admission but a certain part of this structure has been rendered unsound and inadequate by subsequent changes in the economic situation. This, after all, is not very surprising. It would have been a miracle if an agreement desired to cover a short transition period had retained a full validity after its implementation had been delayed for more than two years. The problem is not a mathematical equation but one which concerns human beings who grow and change and whose power constellations are in a state of constant flux.

It seems to me, however, that the main structure of the agreement, its sustaining principles, remain undamaged, and this applies specifically to the keystone, the plebiscite provisions. With goodwill on both sides it should be possible to localise the damage and to replace the outmoded parts by new provisions which take full account. of the changed situation.

There is one important condition, however. The new provisions must be so designed as to fit into the existing edifice. The whole agreement as it stands will be put in jeopardy if the parties, or one of them, press for new provisions which run counter to the structural principles. And the essential principle is of course-I think it bears repeating-that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.

Every argument which bypasses or disregards this agreed objective is not only irrelevant at this stage but potentially destructive of the solid body of agreement which has been achieved. And this is undoubtedly what General Me Naughton. had in mind when, in his proposal, he deprecated the unprofitable discussion of past issues. I agree that it is not always easy to determine which agreements are, and which are not, relevant to the issue which remain unresolved. It does not seem difficult, however, to prune away a number of arguments as entirely unrelated to the remaining issues.

The unresolved issues, as we all know, relate to part II of the 5 August 1949 resolution dealing with the demilitarisation prior to the plebiscite period. Certain principles are set forth in this part of the resolution which form the accepted basis for an agreement, the details of which remain to be worked out. Some of these principles have become defective and inadequate as a result of subsequent development, when those principles have been replaced by new ones which take account of the new situation, the structural skeleton will have to be filled out with the masonry of necessary details in order to become an organic whole.

This remaining task should be comparatively simple if the parties keep firmly in mind its nature and limitations. The problems will become insoluble, however, if the parties go beyond the immediate issues and press arguments which tend to negate the structural principles of the existing agreement.

In this important respect it seems to me that both the parties have erred. Arguments for and against the conclusive legal effect of the Maharaja's letter of accession to India seem to be irrelevant at this stage. The same applies to arguments tending to show that economic and strategic factors, or factors relating to the population's dominant religious allegiance, favour accession to one of the parties rather than to the other. Such arguments are not only irrelevant; they are harmful because they undermine the main principle of the agreement which has been achieved. It is for the plebiscite to deter mine the ultimate fate of the State.

I would like to add that this principle, this keystone of the whole structure, has an importance which transcends the obligatory force it derives from the consent of the parties. The principle has its intrinsic value because it embodies the only criterion for determining Kashmir's fate which is compatible with modern democratic ideals. It should be borne in mind that the unsolved problems concern only the practical procedures through which demilitarisation can be carried out on both sides of the cease-fire line in order to bring about conditions which will enable the Plebiscite Administrator to take over. The parties should therefore faithfully abstain from advancing, let alone pressing, arguments which are incompatible with or unrelated to this objective. Within this rather narrow compass of legitimate disagreement I see only two important considerations against which the opposing arguments should be weighed and measured. One is that the demilitarisation must be carried through as quickly as possible. The other is that the demilitarisation should be so staged as to eliminate fear at any time on the part of the people on either side of the cease-fire line. On this point again I find myself in full agreement with the main principles of the McNaughton proposal.

In conclusion, I beg the parties again to consider their positions and to take full account of their solemn obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their international dispute by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. It would be a tragedy with unforeseeable consequences if they should give up their attempt to reach an amicable solution; it would be doubly tragic because a clear path towards an equitable and honourable settlement is so clearly indicated in the Mc Naughton proposal.