Dr Rajaram Panda

By conducting the fifth nuclear test, North Korea has not only brought the N-issue to the centre stage of world politics, but also heralded an element of volatility in the security scenario in Northeast Asia — the implication of which could be pregnant with many unpredictable consequences

After conducting the fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and a series of missile launches in subsequent months, North Korea stunned the world again by conducting the fifth nuclear test, suspected to be its largest ever, on September 9. As if it was not enough, it has threatened to test another one soon. It claimed to have successfully tested a miniaturised nuclear warhead and “standardised” to mount them on “strategic ballistic rockets”.

The reasoning offered was to protect the nation against “threats and sanctions” from hostile elements. According to an official statement issued by Pyongyang, the successful test was a demonstration of the country’s preparation of retaliation against its enemies, chiefly “US-led hostile forces which have gone desperate in their moves to find fault with the sovereign state’s exercise of the right to self-defense, while categorically denying the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) strategic position as a full-fledge nuclear weapons state”.

The trust deficit among the Northeast Asian states is so high that even before Pyongyang confirmed its claims of conducting a successful nuclear device, Japanese and South Korean authorities had already concluded from the explosion that caused an earthquake that it was a nuclear test by their neighbour. Subsequent information revealed that the blast caused by the test was bigger than the one caused by North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and the “man-made” quake emitted energy double that emitted by the January nuclear test.

Though South Korean military said the magnitude 5.0 seismic wave indicated a 10-kilotonne blast, making it the largest ever by Pyongyang, experts concluded from the seismic activity that the blast could be of 20 to 30 kilotonne. This meant that the nuclear device was larger than the nuclear bomb the US dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and possibly even larger than the one dropped on Nagasaki on August 9 the same year.

North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un has called the US-South Korea annual military drills and the recent decision of deploying Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery system in South Korea as preparation for eventual invasion, which is why it is promoting its nuclear weapon program as a deterrent. Possessing nuclear capability is seen as the guarantee of its survival as a nation. North Korea is suspected to be on track to develop the capability of hitting targets in the region, including Japan, by 2020.

Insecurity Syndrome

Kim Jong-un’s insecurity syndrome is so pervasive that he has resorted to brutal methods such as execution of top military officials, frequent purges, banishing the recalcitrant to camps for hard labour, etc to eliminate any possibility of threat to the regime. Possession of nuclear weapons is, therefore, seen as an absolutely necessary deterrent for external threat as well as for regime survival. Kim Jong-un justifies his country’s weapons programme as a defence against US nuclear “blackmail”.

North Korea has been under sanctions for quite some time but still remains undeterred. These show the sanctions have proved to be ineffective. Even if more and stronger sanctions are imposed, North Korea is likely to withstand as before. And yet, the world powers have little choice than to further tighten sanctions with a view to punish the North.

Any precipitous actions from either side could result in unwelcome possibilities, which neither can afford to face. The powers urging the North to eschew the nuclear path in return for economic and other kinds of help from the international community may have good intentions, but given the past behaviour, the North seems unlikely to yield. So, the likely fear of a potential conflict remains with North Korea as the possible source, which is why world leaders want Kim Jong-un to come to the negotiating table for talks.

Worldwide condemnation

As expected, condemnation followed. South Korean President Park Geun-hye termed North’s act as “maniacal recklessness”. Expressing concern that the nuclear threat from its wayward neighbour was growing fast, she called for tougher new sanctions from the UN Security Council to force the North to change track. US President Barack Obama promised “serious consequences” for North’s provocative actions and reiterated US commitment to the security of its Asian allies. Japan’s Defence Minister Tomomi Inada said North’s test and advances in missile technology posed a grave threat to Japan. Japan’s chief Government spokesperson said they would consider further unilateral sanctions against North Korea.

Though China — North Korea’s only ally — termed the nuclear test as “not wise”, it added that South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD had damaged the region’s strategic balance. China’s foreign ministry opposed the test but urged its neighbours to stop endangering peace in the region.

Toughening Sanctions

North Korea is under severe sanctions and additional tougher sanctions are likely to be imposed. The UN Security Council has already started working on additional “appropriate measures” under Article 41 in a Security Council resolution. The five sets of UN sanctions are in force since the first nuclear test in 2006 and additional ones were imposed in March 2016, after it conducted the fourth test in January, which included prohibitions of supplying aviation fuel, including rocket fuel, trade in minerals and banks and the sale of small arms to Pyongyang. These have failed to deter the North to halt what it insists are defensive weapons and measures.

The US, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China all condemned the blast at the Punggye-ri nuclear site. Since the last sanctions, North Korea carried out 21 ballistic missile launches, such as Rodong and Musudan medium-range ballistic missiles, and a submarine-launched ballistic missile, since the beginning of 2016 — far more than the many it tested until 2015. Pyongyang not only vowed not to submit to US “blackmail” but described President Park Geun-hye as a “dirty prostitute” for working with US forces.

Japan, a non-nuclear country bound by Article 9 of its Constitution, is also facing the heat, besides South Korea — both allies of the US. The Japanese Diet adopted a resolution condemning the North and said its act is “totally unacceptable”. Leading dailies in Japan urged the international community to put pressure on the North to abandon nuclear tests. Besides seeking cooperation from friendly countries to condemn North Korea, Japan is trying to solicit the support of Cuba, where Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is slated to visit soon. Even Vietnam endorsed Japan’s stance in supporting demand to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea has made steady advance in its weapons technology by downsizing nuclear warheads so that they can be carried by missiles. Though it is believed North Korea has developed small nuclear warheads, it is still impossible to verify, given the secretive nature of the regime.

What objective does North Korea aspire to achieve? Its strategic objective is to unify the peninsula on its own terms and to drive the US out of the region. Possession of nuclear weapons and developing missiles capable of delivering miniaturised warheads is considered an effective strategy by Pyongyang. It would be happy if both Japan and South Korea developed doubts on the US extended deterrence commitments. North Korea wants to put Japan and South Korea on test whether the US would “trade Los Angeles for Pyongyang”.

China’s Reaction

Though China joined the US and other powers to impose sanctions on North Korea, its own strategic considerations are so huge that it is unlikely to abandon Pyongyang. Beijing feels uncomfortable that the US has its strategic presence in the region and would work against it even if it means siding with North Korea. China would also not rejoice on the prospect of North Korea collapsing for fear of influx of refugees crossing into its territory and would, therefore, prefer to keep the North afloat even if it disapproves of some of its policies.

Beijing is not expected to reprimand North Korea for its misdeeds and condone it in order to achieve its larger objective of extending its strategic space in the region. For Beijing, the risk of action will be far greater than the risk of inaction. The recent bonhomie that it has built with Seoul because of Kim Jong-un’s disrespect to Beijing and rejection of sane counsel offered by Beijing on some of its recent acts are dissipated by the deployment of the THAAD battery, which affects its security. Thus China opposes the THAAD deployment in South Korea.

Pyongyang realises that there are limits to what the international community can do to impose sanctions to seek compliance. The sanctions imposed are already unprecedented and there is little room for more sanctions that could be more effective. China may have joined other countries in imposing sanctions, but would not want the Kim Jong-un regime to collapse. It would work hard to prevent it in case such a situation arises.

The Indian Interest

Though India does not have any compelling reason to get immediately embroiled in the strategic and nuclear complexities in the Korean Peninsula, as an aspiring power, it is also not expected to watch the development silently from the sidelines. While standing firm in support of important partners such as Japan, South Korea, and the US in dealing with North Korea, India would not only back the voice for sanctions at the UN Security Council but also remind the North about its clandestine nuclear missile cooperation with Pakistan.

The proliferation risk in its neighbourhood with Pyongyang’s involvement would be unwelcome in India. The Ministry of External Affairs had also issued a strong statement denouncing North Korea’s fifth nuclear test and expressed concern “about the proliferation of nuclear missile technologies”, which had “adversely impacted” India’s national security.

The world knows fully well about how the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, traded know-how and nuclear technology in return for supply of Rodong Missiles and technology to his country in mid-1990s. It is suspected that clandestine nuclear and missile ties between Islamabad and Pyongyang are still going on in full knowledge of China. That is India’s worry.

A dreadful scenario

It is obvious that possession of nuclear missiles by North Korea would expose the security of Japan and South Korea, the US protection notwithstanding. With Donald Trump talking about downsizing the US presence in Asia if elected as President, the vulnerabilities of both Asian allies would considerably increase. Once the trust deficit starts surfacing in both Japan and South Korea on dependence on the US in the event of Trump in office, clamour in these two Asian countries shall increase to revisit their nuclear options. A new situation, one would dread, is that the domino effect shall be in full play.

Though these two US allies have separately put in place robust conventional military capabilities, over time, if the US downplays its defence strategy to defend the allies in crisis, the possibility of one or both countries acquiring nuclear weapons could be unpreventable. Both in Japan and South Korea, US commitment to protect them from external attack is coming under scrutiny.

Given that the US credibility is on the wane, acquiring nuclear weapons by Japan and South Korea could emerge as a tempting option. South Korea could be convinced to opt for the nuclear path as a means to deter a North Korean attack and push China to put pressure on its “little brother” to roll back its nuclear programme. If South Korea goes nuclear, Japan could not be expected to sit quiet and could move quickly to develop its own nuclear weapons. It has an enormous stockpile of separated plutonium and the technical know-how to build a sizable number of nuclear warheads in quick time. Such a course could inevitably mean rocking the alliance relationship with the US and would also attract sanctions, but securing the security of the nation could be the only compelling factor to opt for a nuclear path.

In such a scenario, Asia would have emerged as the heavily nuclearised region of the world. Not only would the risk of a nuclear standoff in the Korean Peninsula be high, the logic of striking first to eliminate the other’s capability could gain greater currency. Obama’s 2009 Prague speech wherein he envisaged a nuclear-free world and the three Nuclear Security Summits that he led to carve out a path to achieve this objective would have been rendered useless. This is what worries the world leaders who are grappling with the herculean task of making Kim Jong-un see reason and abandon the nuclear path.

But there is also a counter-argument, which is based on the premise that the world is now a safer place with so many nations as nuclear power states but without a war during the past 70+ years since Hiroshima as mutual deterrence helped maintain peace and prevent war. As an example, India and Pakistan, both being nuclear powers, have avoided a major war despite serious problems, minor skirmishes notwithstanding. Those who make this argument say that the world was an unsafe place with only one nation possessing nuclear weapons and that we have seen what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But an objective assessment of the nuclear issue would lead one to project a grimmer picture of the world as an insane power in possession of the nuclear button might not hesitate in using it.

The second danger is what happens if nuclear weapons land up in the hands of terrorists whose only language is violence and mass destruction. So, whichever way one looks at it, a nuclear North Korea is not welcome. Any misadventure by the unpredictable regime can take the region back to the Ice Age. Preventing such a scenario is the biggest challenge faced by the world leaders today.

The Future course

The most plausible scenario seems to be that the world would have to recognise that North Korea is a “legitimate nuclear weapons state”, which is what it is clamouring for. The fact that North Korea shall remain undeterred from pursuing its programme to increase its nuclear force “in quality and in quantity” can no longer be disputed. The world has to deal with such a North Korea accordingly if any tangible outcome is expected.

The US’s “strategic patience” seems to have overrun its time. The US should either revisit its “pivot” to Asia policy to make the Korean issue more inclusive, which is not the case now, or it should adopt a robust militaristic posture to deal with the issue. Either way, there are risks with unpredictable consequences. Kim Jong-un is not expected to remain blind to note the fate of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or Muammar Gaddafi in Libya when they abandoned their nuclear development programme, and wouldn’t want to end up like them.

The writer is ICCR India Chair Visiting Professor at Reitaku University, Japan

Courtesy: Pioneer: Agenda: Sunday, 18 September 2016