Kuldip Singh Bajwa

ONE of the election promises made by the BJP was to adopt a proactive policy to deal with the proxy war being conducted by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir. Soon after taking office as the Union Home Minister, Mr L.K. Advani reiterated this resolve and issued a strongly worded warning to Pakistan to desist from pushing in armed mercenaries and from aiding and abetting the Pak-trained militants operating in J and K. Similar views were strongly expressed by a number of other government leaders. In the absence of any indication of the scope and thrust of this policy, the expectations of most people for a firmly positive change in the operational situation in the state were raised high.

Unfortunately three rather gruesome massacres carried out by the militants after the warnings and a manifold increase in firing by Pak troops across the LOC/IB, have generated an unhappy counter-reaction.

The rather nebulous understanding of what a proactive policy really implies has further added to the adverse impact. The core theme of a proactive policy in any sphere of activity is a positive orientation to retain the initiative to act to achieve the chosen objectives irrespective of what the adversary does. Applied to Kashmir, it essentially means that we pre-empt Pak designs and deny it the capability to interfere in Kashmir in any manner.

Despite our assertions that Kashmir is an integral part of India, the status of the state in the general world view has come to be regarded as a territory disputed between India and Pakistan. It was our leadership under Nehru who blundered to create this dispute in the first place. Pakistan, which had committed a blatant aggression in Kashmir, lawfully a part of India as provided for in the British Act of Parliament, which created both the dominions, was invested with the legitimacy of a party to a Kashmir dispute where none should have existed. Nevertheless, over the years Kashmir was pushed onto the backburner of the global considerations. Most world leaders, some explicitly and some tacitly, came to subscribe to the view that Kashmir was an issue to be best resolved by India and Pakistan directly between themselves. Had this climate of opinion prevailed, any extra-territorial measures adopted by us to deal with the Pakistani aggression in Kashmir would have been highly unlikely to draw a strong condemnatory reaction. Unfortunately in the wake of our nuclear tests, the rather intemperate rhetoric indulged in by some of the leaders in power which tended to link our demonstrated nuclear capability with the solution to the Kashmir dispute, has raised this issue once again high up on the global agenda.

Pakistan has seized upon this opening to raise the bogey of an arms race which may lead to a nuclear face-off. The traditional patrons of Pakistan have added Kashmir to their regimes of economic sanctions to pressurise India. It has also significantly limited our proactive options against the training camps and mounting bases established by Pakistan across the LOC/IB which are vital for conducting the proxy war in J and K. While it would be operationally logical to destroy these bases, we face two major constraints when considering any operations across the LOC/IB. First both sides of the LOC/IB are heavily manned and any ground operations would be very costly. Second, now that Kashmir has been internationalised again, any armed action by us, whether by air or ground, is likely to draw strong global condemnation and even intervention. Moreover, Pakistan claims that militancy is a part of the Kashmiri freedom struggle. Parallels may well be drawn with Kosovo in Serbia. We are in a catch-22 situation, which needs to be addressed with very sophisticated diplomacy rather than jingoistic rhetoric.

The foundations of a secure state rest on its people. Unfortunately, in Kashmir there have been adverse developments which affected people’s emotions as well as expectations. The grave mistake of incorporating Article 370 in our Constitution tended to create an emotional barrier to a complete assimilation in the secular Indian identity. Over the years the Kashmiri, whom in the course of my long years of service defending the state, I had found to be free of communal inclinations and religious bigotry, became vulnerable to an assault of an Islamic identity unleashed by Pakistan. As a vital first step, the Indian people and the governments at the Centre and in the state need to apply themselves to help rebuild the secular philosophy of the people in Kashmir which was and still basically remains the foundation of their sufi beliefs. To make our efforts credible, we must eliminate all forms of divisive religious fascism from the Indian polity.

Political manipulations had deprived the people of Kashmir of a sense of participation in their own governance. Monumental corruption and mismanagement denied them the benefits of economic development. The democratic institutions in the state must be made effective by peoples’ participation in a governance of transparency. The state administrative apparatus, including the police, needs to be rebuilt so that problems of the people can be addressed speedily and effectively. As happened in Punjab, once the people decide their way of life is better served by elimination of interference, whether internal or abetted from abroad, they would act to restore peace. These undoubtedly are long-term measures but the hearts and minds of an alienated section of society can only be won over a period of time.

What are our immediate workable options to ensure that we are not left to react to the depredations of the mercenaries/militants. At present, every time an atrocity is committed against hapless civilians, we trot out the standard rigmarole of visits by leaders, search and cordon operations and sealing of the borders, all of which hardly carry any conviction. We have to so craft and build up our social and state institutions, the administrative infrastructure, the intelligence apparatus, the operational command and control and well integrated political, administrative and operational regimes, that we firmly retain the initiative at all times.

Sealing of a border is part of a hyperbole indulged in by our leaders. Leave aside the mountain terrain of Kashmir, even in the plains, infiltration from across the borders cannot be completely denied. Besides holding fixed defences, multi-tiered patrolling in between and in considerable depth does significantly limit the infiltration. Those mercenaries/militants who still manage to sneak through cannot survive and carry out their nefarious activities without concealment, shelter and local support. While much of the local support can be eliminated by the people motivated as considered above, there would always be elements who would act otherwise out of their vested convictions or out of a fear of the gun. Notwithstanding the large presence of the security forces, it is very necessary to build the ability and the confidence of the people to face the militants. At present, the village defence societies are poorly organised and equipped. The antiquated .303 rifle is no match for the sophisticated fire power of the militants. It is essential to rethink the whole concept and make it the foundation of an integrated internal defence. Besides better arms, highly motivated and defence trained advisers should be provided to train as well as stiffen up the village defence societies. A radio communication network must link these societies. Speedy response from security forces both with conventional as well as helicopter borne mobility should be in place. Once effectively equipped, organised and put in place, these measures would severely restrict the freedom of the mercenaries and militants to operate in the country side.

There are a whole host of impediments in the way of conducting effective security operations. Effective and timely intelligence is the bedrock upon which anti-militant operations are based. At present, a whole host of intelligence agencies are engaged in a game of one-upmanship. A similar scenario obtains in the conduct of operations. Besides the Army, there is a whole heterogeneous mix of paramilitary and police forces with some private armies also thrown in. With our traditions of every entity zealously guarding its turf, a dynamic and winning operational focus is very hard to forge and maintain. Even where a modicum of unified command has been put together, in actual practice disparate pulls are often frustrating. A well-defined unified command under the Army with an integrated joint intelligence centre as a part of this structure must be established. Suitable mechanism needs to be evolved whereby the state government can be fully involved into the planning and conduct of anti-militant operations without in any way diluting its constitutional functions. As the militants are eliminated and the capability of the people and the state organisations is built up, the role of the security forces will decline.

In the past we have not done enough to expose the role of Pakistan in stoking terrorism and militancy in Kashmir. There is a need to conduct many more exposures like the one recently held in the Parliament House at New Delhi. Teams should also be sent abroad to conduct similar exposures. We must also extensively focus our visual media and other means of exposure to inform and educate the cross-sections of often misinformed society from which the ISI gathers its mercenaries. It may well dissuade many of them from throwing in their lot into a cause, which besides being unjust, is hopeless.

It will take quite some time to completely restore a durable peace in J and K. To achieve it, we will need to cut across many of the lines of vested turf and forge a truly integrated national purpose and endeavour. Only then will emerge a purposeful proactive policy in Kashmir.
(The writer is a retired Major-General.)

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The views expressed in the Article above are Author’s personal views and kashmiribhatta.in is not responsible for the opinions expressed in the above article.

Courtesy: The Tribune: 8 August, 1998